The world is turning to Japan

We are living through a period of unusual fracture in which the architecture of global partnerships is being rebuilt in real time — not just recalibrated, but fundamentally reconsidered. Governments and companies that spent decades optimizing for efficiency are now optimizing for resilience, redrawing supply chains and questioning trade relationships that were once taken for granted. In that environment, the premium placed on credibility — on partners with the depth, stability, and consistency to deliver over the long term — has never been higher.

Against that backdrop, one country has emerged as a remarkable point of convergence. Across geographies that rarely agree on anything — the Gulf and Latin America, Southeast Asia and Europe, established democracies and emerging economies — Japan has become the partner that an extraordinary range of countries and companies are turning toward. In a fractured world, that kind of broad, cross-regional pull is almost without precedent.

The data bears this out with striking consistency. SEC Newgate’s own Impact Monitor, drawing on research across more than 20,000 respondents in 20 markets, shows Japan ranking as a preferred trade partner from Singapore to Saudi Arabia, from Brazil to Spain — first in Singapore, second in India, Brazil, and Mexico, and consistently in the top three across Western markets. The Gallup Organization’s February 2026 survey tells the same story from a different angle: for the first time in over 35 years, neither Canada nor Great Britain led American favorability rankings — Japan did, at 85%, among the highest readings Gallup has recorded for any country since 1989. A Euroconsumers survey covering 10 EU member states reinforces the picture further, finding that 51% of European consumers now identify Japan as the EU’s top trade priority, ahead of the United States. The moment is real, it is measurable, and it is arriving fast.

What the rankings reflect is something deeper than bilateral goodwill or trade volumes — it is the payoff from decades of deliberate investment in soft power through diplomacy, development assistance, cultural influence, and consistent corporate behaviour, all of which has positioned Japan as a preferred partner across a remarkably diverse set of markets. Japan’s reputation consistently outperforms its relative economic size, and that accumulated credibility is now converting into concrete strategic and commercial advantage at precisely the moment when the world is most actively looking for it. The security dimension adds further weight: Japan’s defence posture has shifted more fundamentally in the past three years than in the previous five decades, signalling a country that is not just reliable, but increasingly capable and strategically engaged.

It is precisely to meet this moment, and to help our clients navigate and capitalize on Japan’s expanding role, that SEC Newgate opened its Japan office this year.

As supply chains are reconfigured and investment strategies recalibrated, Japan is increasingly seen not just as a market or supplier, but as a strategic partner for long-term growth. Companies that align with Japanese firms — whether through joint ventures, co-investment, or technology collaboration — stand to benefit from enhanced resilience and greater market access.

Japan and the United States: a partnership defined by the moment

In March of this year, President Donald Trump hosted Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi at the White House for a summit and formal dinner that captured, in a single evening, just how central Japan has become to America’s strategic and economic priorities. The guest list told part of the story — Google CEO Sundar Pichai, SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son, and BlackRock’s Larry Fink among roughly 70 guests in the State Dining Room — as did the announcements that accompanied it: up to $40 billion in joint nuclear energy development through GE Vernova Hitachi, $33 billion in natural gas infrastructure, a memorandum on deep-sea minerals cooperation, and further progress on Japan’s broader $550 billion US investment commitment targeting semiconductors, critical minerals, AI, and energy. This was not ceremonial diplomacy. It was a working session between two governments that have decided their futures are materially linked, conducted in the presence of the CEOs who will actually build that future.

Japan’s strategic repositioning in the Indo-Pacific
That the relationship has reached this point is the product of a partnership stretching back more than seven decades. The US-Japan alliance, forged in the aftermath of World War II and codified in the 1951 Mutual Security Treaty, has underpinned regional stability across the Indo-Pacific for generations — providing the security architecture within which Japan rebuilt its economy and East Asia developed into the world’s most dynamic economic region. What is different now is not the durability of that foundation but the ambition being built on top of it. Japan is no longer the protected partner in the relationship. It is becoming a co-architect of Indo-Pacific order, bringing its own capabilities, capital, and strategic weight to a partnership that both governments are explicitly describing as entering a new era.

The security dimension is where that shift is most visible and most consequential for Washington. Japan’s defense transformation — record budgets, counter-strike capabilities, an upgraded joint command architecture with US Forces Japan, and accelerating co-development across missiles, semiconductors, and naval systems — addresses the Trump administration’s core ask of allies: show up as capable contributors, not dependents. When Trump needed to test alliance reliability in a live scenario earlier this year, asking allied nations to help patrol the Strait of Hormuz, Takaichi was the first allied leader to walk into the Oval Office in response. That sequencing was not accidental — it reflected where Japan sits in Washington’s hierarchy of relationships right now.

The economics reinforce the picture. Japan is the largest single source of foreign direct investment in the United States, with FDI stock of $754 billion built up consistently over more than a decade, supporting close to one million American jobs concentrated in manufacturing. Total bilateral goods and services trade runs to over $300 billion annually. These are not abstract figures — they represent supply chains, factory floors, and research facilities woven into the physical fabric of the American economy in ways that make the relationship structurally self-reinforcing.

What the US-Japan shift means for global corporations
For multinational corporations, the reconfiguration of the US-Japan relationship is one of the most consequential strategic signals of this decade. A bilateral relationship deepening simultaneously across defence co-production, critical minerals, energy, and technology standards — and now backed by public sentiment to match — creates a window that serious businesses will want to be positioned ahead of, not catching up to. The complexity of this moment also raises the stakes for how companies engage: navigating a relationship evolving this rapidly across government, regulatory, and commercial dimensions on both sides of the Pacific demands corporate diplomacy as much as market strategy. For companies thinking seriously about Japan, that capability is increasingly the difference between accessing the opportunity and watching it from the outside.

Japan and EU: a reassessment of strategic priorities

Reading between the lines of what circulates along the corridors of the Berlaymont or the European Parliament, something has shifted in Brussels over the past eighteen months in the world of trade relations. Japan — a country that rarely dominated the agenda in EU institutional corridors — has started appearing with striking regularity. You see it in committee discussions, in supply chain resilience workshops, in private conversations between corporate affairs directors trying to map out what comes next. That frequency is worth paying attention to.

Part of it is circumstance. The weakening of the transatlantic relationship has forced European companies and policymakers to reconsider partnerships they previously took for granted. And this is also reflected in some very telling data across multiple surveys – the SEC Newgate Impact Monitor shows Japan ranking among the most positively perceived international partners globally: 65% of respondents rate the relationship as good or better, on a par with Canada and the United Kingdom. An Euroconsumers survey from February 2026, covering 10 EU member states, found that 51% of European consumers now identify Japan (and South Korea) as the EU’s top trade priority, ahead of the United States. As well, Gallup data tells a compatible story: as trust in traditionally dominant partners erodes and rule-based, institutionally stable actors gain ground. These analyses confirm a trend. But they don’t explain it because what is actually happening is something more structural.

From efficiency to resilience
European businesses have spent thirty years optimising supply chains for efficiency. The disruptions of the past five years — pandemic, war in Ukraine, tariff escalation — exposed the cost of that optimisation. Resilience was sacrificed for margin. Japan offers something different in sectors that matter: automotive components, semiconductor materials, pharmaceuticals, and high-precision engineering. When combined alongside regulatory standards and IP protections that are genuinely compatible with European frameworks, Japan becomes an optimal and key trade partner.

As the EU deepens its engagement with CPTPP members – the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, one of the world’s largest high-standards trade blocs spanning the Indo-Pacific – and explore the possibility of a future trade and investment agreement, Japan’s pivotal role within that bloc further cements its status as a strategic ally. This convergence is reinforced by a shared commitment to WTO reform and the modernisation of multilateral trade. To this day, the primary instrument for this cooperation remains the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement; yet, despite being in force since 2019, it remains significantly underutilised. It is precisely in this gap between legal architecture and strategic intent that the opportunity sits.

The business implications of the EU-Japan relationship
There is also a less obvious dimension, which corporate affairs professionals are better placed than most to see. The contest to define global standards in AI governance, renewable hydrogen, battery technology, and digital infrastructure is not primarily a technical race — it is a political one. Japan and the EU share a fundamental common interest in making sure that the rule-making in these domains reflects open-economy, rule-of-law principles. Companies that position themselves as effective bridges between the two regulatory ecosystems will have a structural advantage that competitors building exclusively transatlantic or exclusively China-facing capabilities will find difficult to replicate.

The consumer side deserves attention, too. Not as a soft story about sentiment, but as a market signal. According to the Euroconsumers survey, 44% of European consumers have already reduced their purchases from US companies. The same logic that drives that behaviour creates real commercial space for EU-Japan propositions built around stability, quality convergence, and shared standards. This is not brand positioning. It is market access.

The EU-Japan relationship has been strategically undervalued for a long time, treated as solid but secondary, dependable but not urgent. The current moment, enhanced by the success of the 2025 EU-Japan summit and the launch of the Competitiveness Alliance – to boost cooperation on trade, economic security and innovation – has changed that calculation. For European business leaders, the question is no longer whether Japan belongs at the centre of their Asia strategy. It is whether they have the organisational readiness to act on that recognition before the window narrows.

Japan and India: a long-term partnership amid shifting global equations

India’s relationship with Japan can be described as good, with a clear movement toward excellent. It is not merely a government-to-government relationship. This relationship has not been built only on trade. It rests on a rare mix of historical affinity, public goodwill, infrastructure partnership, strategic trust, and a shared interest in building a stable, technology-led Asian future.

The public sentiment is striking. According to the recent SEC Newgate Global Impact Monitor, 88% of surveyed Indians rate India’s relationship with Japan as good — second only to the United Arab Emirates at 89%.

The deep roots of the India-Japan relation
This favourable Indian view has deep roots. India and Japan share civilisational links through Buddhism, which travelled from India to Japan and left a lasting influence on Japanese culture. Modern diplomatic goodwill also has a strong post-war foundation. India signed a peace treaty with Japan in 1952 and waived reparations, a gesture that created goodwill in Japan at a difficult moment in its history. Over time, this relationship has evolved into what both sides call a Special Strategic and Global Partnership — a phrase that reflects cooperation across diplomacy, security, investment, infrastructure, technology, energy and people-to-people ties.

The most visible symbol of this relationship is the Mumbai-Ahmedabad high-speed rail project, popularly known as the bullet train project, which uses Japanese Shinkansen technology. A 5-trillion-yen investment pledge over five years (from 2022) supports “Make in India” via supply chain diversification and the India-Japan Industrial Competitiveness Partnership. The Delhi Metro became one of India’s most admired urban transport projects with Japanese financial and technical support. Japan has also supported the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor and the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, both of which are important for improving logistics, industrial capacity and manufacturing competitiveness in India.

Japan is also one of India’s most important sources of foreign direct investment. According to Indian government data cited in 2025, Japanese investment into India exceeded $43 billion between 2000 and 2024, making Japan India’s fifth-largest source of foreign investment. More importantly, Japanese investment is not seen in India as short-term capital. It is associated with manufacturing discipline, technology transfer, quality systems and long-term industrial partnerships. Companies such as Suzuki, Toyota, Honda, Panasonic, Hitachi and Mitsubishi have helped shape India’s automotive, electronics, engineering and infrastructure sectors.

In 2025, India and Japan adopted the Joint Vision for the Next Decade, setting a target of 10 trillion yen, or about $68 billion, in private investment from Japan into India over the next decade. This is not just an investment number. It signals that Japan sees India as a major long-term production, innovation and supply-chain partner. India, in turn, sees Japan as a trusted partner for its manufacturing ambitions, especially in electronics, semiconductors, electric mobility, critical minerals and advanced industrial technologies.

Bilateral trade has grown, though it remains below potential. Japan’s bilateral trade with India stood at $22.85 billion in financial year 2023-24, with Japanese exports to India at $17.69 billion and Indian exports to Japan at $5.15 billion. The India-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, in force since 2011, reduced tariffs on a large number of goods and created a framework for cooperation in services and investment. Yet India’s export share in Japan remains limited, and both countries need to do more to improve market access, standards alignment, services trade and business mobility.

A common approach on energy transition
A major new pillar of the relationship is clean energy. Japan is emerging as an important alternative energy partner for India, especially in hydrogen, ammonia, carbon reduction technologies and nuclear energy. In August 2025, the two countries held the 11th India-Japan Energy Dialogue and welcomed progress in energy efficiency, clean hydrogen, ammonia, renewable energy, carbon capture and advanced energy technologies. India and Japan also issued a Joint Declaration of Intent on Clean Hydrogen and Ammonia, aimed at promoting research, investment and project implementation in both countries and in third countries. This fits well with India’s ambition to become a green hydrogen hub and Japan’s search for reliable partners in future fuels.

Nuclear energy is another strategic area. For India, which needs large-scale clean baseload power as it grows, Japan’s technological capabilities and safety culture are valuable. For Japan, India represents a major democratic partner in the global clean energy transition.

Challenges and the next phase of cooperation
There are also areas where things can improve. Japanese companies still find India’s regulatory environment complex, with land acquisition, taxation disputes, slow contract enforcement and uneven infrastructure across Indian states as challenges. India would like Japanese investment to move faster into high-growth sectors such as semiconductors, batteries, robotics, clean energy equipment and advanced manufacturing. People-to-people exchanges are also limited. The 2025 commitment to expand exchanges of workers, students and professionals is therefore important.

Overall, India views Japan as a trusted, high-quality and future-facing partner. The relationship is good today because it has delivered visible results. It can become excellent if both countries move from project-by-project cooperation to a deeper industrial, energy and technology partnership. In a world looking for dependable partnerships, India-Japan ties offer a powerful example of trust translated into nation-building.

Japan and Australia: a shared vision behind a long-term economic cooperation

Australia’s relationship with Japan stands out for its depth, durability and trust. It is a relationship that has matured beyond trade flows into one underpinned by shared interests: economic resilience, regional stability and long-term strategic alignment.

The strength of this partnership is reflected clearly in public sentiment. The 2025 SEC Newgate Impact Monitor shows that 75% of Australians view Japan as a positive international relationship, ranking it third behind only behind fellow Commonwealth countries, the United Kingdom and Canada. In return, the Japanese ranked Australia as their top relationship. This is not simply goodwill; it is a societal signal that the relationship is seen as stable, constructive and beneficial in uncertain times.

Japan: a trusted partner for national resilience
Australia–Japan ties are built on hard‑edged economic cooperation across energy, resources, manufacturing and technology, but what sets the relationship apart is its long‑term discipline. Japanese investment in Australia is characterised by patience, industrial scale and strategic intent, closely aligned with Australian expectations around responsible capital, operational resilience and enduring community value. In an environment where public confidence increasingly hinges on local outcomes, that capital model matters.

The Impact Monitor underscores a shift toward economic relationships that deliver visible domestic benefit: local investment, jobs, energy security and sovereign capability, even at higher cost. Against growing concern about foreign ownership and supply‑chain fragility, Japan occupies a distinct position, viewed not as a source of vulnerability, but as a partner that strengthens national resilience. Beyond economics, this extends to shared strategic purpose: both countries are increasingly aligned as like‑minded middle powers, committed to rules‑based trade, institutional stability and regional balance at a time when economic security, national security and social licence have become inseparable.

On the Mogami Contract: defence and security collaboration
In terms of building on this already strong platform, the historic visit of new Japanese PM, Sanae Takaichi to Australia this month could not come at a better time. Australia and Japan recently signed a new and groundbreaking era in defence, technology and R&D collaboration. The signing of the contract for the first three of the upgraded Mogami Class Frigates for the RAN on 18th April, part of a larger AUD$20 billion contract, and the accompanying “Mogami Memorandum”, will greatly strengthen the supply chains in critical and innovative defence technology between the two countries.

On energy security and the Inpex project
Energy and decarbonisation represent one of the most important frontiers of this partnership. While Australians remain cost‑sensitive about the pace and price of the energy transition, the Impact Monitor shows clear majority support for renewable energy and climate action, with two‑thirds of Australians believing it is important for the country’s future to transition to clean energy.

Japan’s interest in secure, diversified and low‑carbon energy sources aligns closely with Australia’s resource endowments and transition objectives. Collaboration across hydrogen, ammonia, critical minerals and renewables positions the bilateral relationship not just as a buyer–supplier dynamic, but as a shared strategic response to energy security and decarbonisation pressures across the Indo‑Pacific.

For more than 40 years, Australia has been a true, tried and tested partner in energy supply to Japan. Australia continues to supply ~30% of Japan’s total energy needs.

The scale and ambition of Japanese investment in Australia’s energy sector is well established and perhaps best exemplified by INPEX’s Ichthys LNG project, an undertaking of extraordinary engineering complexity which, at the time of its final investment decision in 2012, represented the largest single overseas investment ever made by a Japanese private company. Since 2011, INPEX’s capital investment in Australia has exceeded AUD$76 billion, generating more than AUD$1.5 billion in annual operating revenue and underscoring the enduring economic significance of this partnership.

On Japanese FDI and innovative AI related investment in Australia
Japan is now Australia’s second‑largest source of cumulative Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), totalling approximately AUD$159.5 billion. Importantly, that investment has broadened well beyond resources and energy, extending across almost every sector of the Australian economy, including financial services, space, defence, cyber security, telecommunications and ICT, critical minerals, education and training, construction and real estate, alongside traditional strengths such as health, agriculture and food processing.

One of the more significant recent developments is the emergence of Japanese investment in AI‑oriented data centre capacity in Sydney. This reflects Australia’s strong digital fundamentals, particularly New South Wales’ access to international submarine cable networks and the depth and maturity of the Greater Sydney data‑centre ecosystem.

Implications for policymakers and global corporations
For policymakers, the Australia–Japan relationship offers a platform to pursue economic security without retreating into protectionism. It demonstrates that trusted international partnerships can coexist with strong domestic expectations around localisation, sovereignty and fairness.

For corporates, the message is equally clear. In both countries, success increasingly depends on local credibility, community contribution and long-term intent. Japanese firms operating in Australia, and Australian firms engaging with Japan, are well placed, but increasingly judged not just on commercial performance, but on how visibly they contribute to local priorities: jobs, energy security, capability and trust.

In a fragmented world, the Australia–Japan relationship shows what sustainable international partnership looks like: strategic, reciprocal and rooted in public confidence.

Japan and Singapore: from trade corridor to like-minded partners

The evolution of Singapore’s relationship with Japan from a traditional trade partner to a co-investor and technology partner signals a maturation of bilateral ties – from transaction to collaboration and from access to shared ambition. Public sentiment recognises this growth: 84% of Singaporeans say the Republic has a good business and ESG relationship with Japan, according to findings from the 2025 SEC Newgate Impact Monitor. This reflects six decades of institutional investment, economic cooperation, and most recently, a reframing of what bilateral relations are designed to achieve.

In March 2026, Singapore and Japan elevated their ties to a strategic partnership, coinciding with the 60^thanniversary of diplomatic relations. Writing in the Nikkei ahead of his official visit to Tokyo, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong observed that both nations confront “a world marked by intense uncertainty, fragmentation, and disruption“, which demands deeper cooperation between like-minded partners committed to rules-based trade and open, resilient economies.

Japan was Singapore’s fourth largest trading partner and source of foreign direct investment as of 2024, underscoring strong bilateral ties. The deepening of this partnership is already visible on the ground. In July 2025, NTT DC REIT’s listing on the Singapore Exchange – the largest REIT listing in a decade – drew Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund GIC as a cornerstone investor. In November 2025, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group launched an agentic AI solutions venture in Singapore to build enterprise AI capabilities.

These moves reflect a broader reorientation, with both governments recently committing to collaborate on semiconductors, AI governance, quantum research and the digital and green infrastructure underpinning the region’s transition.

What the next phase of the Japan-Singapore partnership means for policymakers and global corporations

• Energy and sustainability: Both countries are advancing collaboration on low-carbon hydrogen, ammonia, carbon capture and civil nuclear energy.
• Digital governance: As co-conveners of the World Trade Organization E-Commerce Initiative alongside Australia, both countries are well positioned to shape the region’s regulatory infrastructure.
• Geopolitics: Singapore’s role as ASEAN coordinator and incoming 2027 chair makes it a natural conduit for Japan-ASEAN engagement under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

For policymakers, this evolution reinforces Singapore’s value as a neutral hub linking Northeast and Southeast Asia. For corporates, it creates fresh opportunities to build regional platforms combining Japanese technological depth with Singapore’s connectivity, capital markets and access to Southeast Asia’s growth sectors. Together, both countries are increasingly defining a model of Indo-Pacific partnerships, centred on co-imagination, co-creation and co-evolution.

Japan and Latin America: strategic alignment in an era of fragmentation and supply chain reconfiguration

In Latin America, Japan is consistently ranked among the most positively perceived international partners. According to SEC Newgate’s Impact Monitor, in Brazil, 70% of respondents rate the relationship with Japan as good, very good or excellent, placing it among the top three most positively perceived global partners. In Mexico, this perception is even stronger, reaching 74%, again positioning Japan among the country’s most trusted international relationships.

As evidenced by SEC Newgate’s Impact Monitor, the growing shift toward localisation, is intensifying the tension between global integration and local expectations, shaping the current operating environment for companies navigating Japan-Latin America relations.

Brazil: long-term strategic assets and governance complexity
The Brazil–Japan relationship is complementary. Brazil is one of the world’s largest exporters of agricultural commodities and natural resources, while Japan is a major importer of food, energy inputs and industrial materials. In 2025, Brazilian exports to Japan reached approximately US$5.5 billion, largely concentrated in iron ore, meat, soy products and other commodities. Japan’s structural dependence on imports reinforces this relationship. For example, the country relies on imports for roughly one-third of its food supply, making long-term partnerships with agricultural exporters strategically important.

Recent political developments suggest an effort to deepen this relationship. In 2025, Brazil and Japan signedmultiple agreements to expand cooperation in trade, investment and technology, marking a new phase in bilateral relations. These initiatives are aligned with broader global trends, including the need to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on geopolitically sensitive regions.

From a business perspective, three sectors stand out:

• Agribusiness: Brazil remains a key supplier of meat, grains and food products, with growing diversification toward Asian markets as US trade policies fluctuate. Recent export shifts show Brazil redirecting agricultural flows toward markets such as Japan amid tariff disruptions elsewhere.
• Energy transition: Brazil’s leadership in biofuels, hydropower and renewable energy aligns with Japan’s decarbonisation agenda, creating opportunities in ethanol, hydrogen and sustainable aviation fuel.
• Critical minerals and mining: As global competition intensifies around battery materials and industrial inputs, Brazil’s resource base becomes increasingly strategic.

The broader macroeconomic environment also introduces uncertainty. Rising global tariffs and slower trade growth are expected to weigh on Brazilian exports, even as strong agricultural output supports overall performance. Beyond economics, cultural ties play a significant role. Brazil hosts the largest Japanese diaspora outside Japan, estimated at over 2 million people, which has historically facilitated business, trust and institutional relationships between the two countries.

Key considerations for companies operating across Brazil and Japan

• Strong demand alignment in food, energy and resource security
• Growing opportunities in energy transition and sustainable technologies
• Increasing importance of ESG and reputational positioning
• Regulatory and fiscal complexity requiring active stakeholder management
• Long-term strategic positioning over short-term market gains

Mexico: manufacturing integration and nearshoring at scale
Japan’s relationship with Mexico is fundamentally industrial. Unlike Brazil, where trade is resource-driven, Mexico is deeply embedded in global manufacturing networks. Japanese companies have invested heavily in the country, particularly in automotive and electronics sectors, with investments exceeding US$18 billion in the auto industry alone. Trade flows reflect this integration. In 2025, Japanese exports to Mexico reached approximately US$11.6 billion, largely composed of machinery, automotive components and industrial equipment. At the same time, Japan represents around 3% of Mexico’s export destinations and over 3% of its imports, underscoring its role as a key industrial partner.

Managing geopolitical exposure in Mexico’s investment landscape
However, this model is increasingly exposed to geopolitical risk. US trade policy remains the single most important variable affecting Mexico’s economy. Tariffs, reshoring incentives and potential USMCA renegotiations create uncertainty for foreign investors. Recent discussions around tariffs on Mexican exports have already raised concerns among Japanese manufacturers about the sustainability of their investment strategies.

At the same time, Mexico is actively diversifying its partnerships. Recent energy cooperation agreements with Japan, including crude oil exports, signal an effort to deepen bilateral ties beyond manufacturing. From a business environment perspective, Mexico combines strong industrial capability with structural challenges. These include infrastructure gaps, regulatory shifts and security concerns in certain regions. Additionally, like Brazil, Mexico shows strong societal expectations for local impact:

• 64% support local hiring even at higher cost
• 59% support local manufacturing under the same conditions

These expectations reinforce the need for companies to balance efficiency with local engagement and legitimacy.

Key considerations for companies operating across Mexico and Japan

• High exposure to US trade policy and geopolitical shifts
• Significant Japanese presence in manufacturing, especially automotive
• Growing diversification into energy and broader trade cooperation
• Increasing pressure for local economic contribution and stakeholder alignment

The need for an integrated approach
Japan’s engagement with Latin America reflects a broader transformation in global economic strategy. Rather than relying on single-market dependencies, companies are increasingly adopting diversified, multi-regional approaches that balance efficiency, resilience and geopolitical risk.

At the same time, the operating environment is becoming more complex. SEC Newgate’s Impact Monitor highlights that companies are now judged not only on economic performance, but also on their ability to deliver local impact, manage stakeholder expectations and operate responsibly across jurisdictions. For businesses and policymakers, the implication is clear: success in these markets requires more than market entry strategies. It demands an integrated approach that combines geopolitical awareness, regulatory understanding and stakeholder engagement.

In this context, advisory capabilities that bridge global strategy and local execution become critical. Supporting companies in navigating policy landscapes, aligning with societal expectations and managing reputational risk is increasingly central to enabling long-term, sustainable growth across Japan–Latin America relations.