Germany’s September State Elections

Key takeaways

• The September 20 elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania reinforced the electoral fragmentation visible in Saxony-Anhalt two weeks earlier.
• In Schwerin, the AfD became the strongest party while the Left won Berlin, leaving the CDU bleeding out in both states and intensifying the debate on Chancellor Merz´s party leadership political survival, despite publicly ruling out resignation.
• Beyond the crisis of the traditional political centrum both results reflect the erosion within the pro-business German consensus, as established parties are failing to reconcile fiscal consolidation, competitiveness and economic reform with growing demands for state intervention and social protection against rising cost of livings.

Coalition scenarios – Berlin 

According to the preliminary final results, the Left won the election with 25.7 percent, its strongest result in the state since reunification, followed by the CDU on 18.8 percent, the AfD on 16.3 percent, the Greens on 14.3 percent and the SPD on 12.1 percent. This result removes the CDU-SPD majority and gives the Left the opportunity to lead the next city-state government and appointing Berlin’s mayor. A Linke-Green-SPD coalition would have a majority, while a CDU-Green-SPD coalition would also be mathematically possible. The main political obstacle to a left-led coalition is the dispute over housing policy: the Left’s leading candidate Elif Eralp has made the socialisation of large housing companies a central objective, while the SPD has opposed such measure. A recent survey found 51 percent of Berliners opposed expropriation with compensation, compared with 37 percent in favor, underlining the gap between its electoral mandate and the broader electorate on one of its flagship policies. 

Coalition scenarios – Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 

According to the preliminary final results, the AfD emerged as the strongest party with 38.2 percent of the votes, narrowly ahead of the SPD at 35.5 percent. The Left received 6.5 percent and the Greens 5.7 percent, while the CDU fell to 4.9 percent, narrowly missing the 5 percent threshold and, for the first time in Germany´s Federal Republic’s history, losing representation in a state parliament. The far-left BSW also failed to enter the Landtag with 4.8 percent. Thanks to a significant late recovery, the SPD managed to narrow the gap to the AfD, thereby enabling incumbant State Minister-President Manuela Schwesig to remain in office. This outcome was led by Schwesig’s strategy to campaign against the federal government’s reform course, positioning herself as a regional counterweight to Merz’s energy and economic agenda, distancing the state’s social democrats SPD from the federal party’s unpopular governing coalition standing. A continuation of the previous SPD-Linke coalition is no longer possible, but an SPD-Linke-Green coalition would command a parliamentary majority. The AfD’s first-place finish will likely not translate into a governing option, as the other parties remain committed to the firewall policy. Finally, the success of the SPD leading candidate by leveraging in combining government experience with an increasingly confrontational stance towards Berlin may strengthen the SPD’s incentives to differentiate itself further from Merz’s CDU at the federal level.

Election implications – Federal level 

The old West German party system is in free fall. The Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania results reinforce the undergoing profound shift of Germany’s federal political system underpinned by the traditional CDU-CSU and SPD axis. The Left’s surge combined with the AfD’s breakthrough as leading party in two states demonstrate how German voters are increasingly consolidating around political poles outside the traditional center. Nationwide the traditional German “bourgeois camp” – standing for economic liberalism, conservative values, technological modernization, fiscal discipline and Germany’s Western orientation – represented by the CDU-CSU and the liberals-FDP once regularly commanded a majority of the vote between them, whereas now represents roughly only one quarter of the political electorate. However, the ultimate test to this erosion trend will be in western Germany next year, as North Rhine-Westphalia — Germany’s most populous state — will head to the polls in April. 

While Chancellor Merz may have survived the election night, his federal leadership is very much being questioned. The CDU’s failure to clear 5 percent threshold in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania represents a historic seizure for the party that is almost impossible to ignore. Despite Merz ruling out resignation on election night yesterday, internal party reporting indicates that leadership discussions are underway. Moreover, few credible alternatives are present within the current political landscape. Hendrik Wüst is the most obvious CDU option, but moving to Berlin would mean abandoning his position in North Rhine-Westphalia only seven months before the 2027 state election. Markus Söder remains the most prominent CSU alternative, but a CSU Chancellor leading a weakened Union would be politically difficult to construct, particularly if the SPD had to endorse him, and Söder himself has repeatedly ruled out a Merz removal. Alexander Dobrindt represents a complicated but potentially coalition-compatible option: as a CSU politician, he faces the same problem as Söder, but his reputation as a pragmatic negotiator and his established working relationship with the SPD could theoretically make him easier for the SPD as coalition partner to support. 

It is important to note also that a change of Chancellor is constitutionally and politically demanding, with only two viable options existing. First, Merz could resign voluntarily, which he so far has explicitly ruled this out. Secondly, the Bundestag could replace him through a constructive vote of no confidence, under Article 67 of Germany’s Constitution. This would require the Bundestag to elect a successor with the majority of all its members — currently 316 of 630 MPs — rather than merely voting against Merz. Moreover, the prospective Chancellor would need to secure a parliamentary majority from a coalition that already has only a narrow margin and would need the SPD to support the replacement. 

Above all, Germany’s traditional economic consensus has lost its political constituency. The CDU’s claim to economic efficiency is no longer translating into votes, while the FDP has largely disappeared as an electoral vehicle for liberal voters. Concurrently, the AfD is successfully combining economic dissatisfaction with migration, security and national identity, ignoring underlying questions about the fiscal sustainability of its political agenda at odds with Berlin’s integration into European markets. The emerging political vacuum extends beyond “left versus right” and signals a contest over what a new economically credible center should look like.

What to watch – Berlin 

Berlin could provide an interesting test of whether the political left can turn electoral success into governing credibility, with an agenda centered on increased public ownership and intervention rather than market-based supply expansion. The Left’s victory gives it the strongest mandate, but the likely SPD-Green-Linke coalition would have to reconcile diverging positions on housing, fiscal policy, and cost of living issues. On the other hand, the CDU’s response to its electoral decline will have to navigate how to sharpen its conservative profile to recover voters from the AfD while maintaining the firewall policy and appealing among centrist voters as a viable governing party. 

What to watch – Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania

In Schwerin the SPD can remain in government with the Left and the Greens, but the new coalition would face an embolden AfD opposition as largest party. The upcoming state government will immediately have to deliver on economic development, infrastructure and public services on as a response for being a credible alternative to the AfD. As the CDU lost its parliamentary foothold in the state entirely, the party faces a structural problem in eastern Germany rather than a series of isolated campaign failures.